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Before beginning on the subject, please allow me the following reflection: the
COVID-19 pandemic and the restrictive measures adopted across Latin America
have increased insecurity, suffering and hunger for millions across the region.
Although restrictions on free transit, freedom of work, and freedom of assembly,
among others, are legitimate – given that social distancing is the only weapon
against this virus – we must be aware that millions of people in Latin America
 survive due to their work in the informal sector. It is unacceptable that for many, the
only options during this pandemic are to be killed by hunger or by COVID-19. For
this reason, following this emergency, the region must resume a debate about the
relevance of a new social or welfare state, without corruption, that can provide basic
public services including healthcare.
Almost all governments in Latin America – with the exception of Nicaragua – have
taken exceptional measures to stop the uncontrollable spread of COVID-19, be it
through declaring states of emergency or public health emergencies. Faced with
this, there is a valid fear and mistrust that these measures could exacerbate abuses
of power or increase human rights violations. This mistrust is understandable,
considering the continent’s terrible history of civil and military dictatorships utilizing
states of emergency to persecute political opponents and social leaders, and of
regimes who, thanks to the abdication of ordinary justice – and the leading role of
military courts – were able to commit serious human rights violations and acts of
grand corruption with impunity.
This fear and mistrust is also understandable when confronted with the governing
style and narratives of some presidents currently in power. This is the case in the
United States with Donald Trump; in Brazil with Jair Bolsonaro; in Venezuela with
Nicolás Maduro; in Nicaragua with Daniel Ortega and in El Salvador with Nayib
Bukele.
On the other hand, all democratic legal frameworks in the region contemplate
cases of constitutional exception in the face of unforeseen or emergency situations
including natural disasters, warfare, major social unrest, and epidemics, among
others. In such cases, among other possible consequences, the Executive can
be granted exceptional powers that permit the restriction of fundamental rights
regarding security, public budgets, public health measures, market regulation, and
border control, among others. The Executive is also granted special powers in
regard to the armed forces and police.
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As a counterweight to these constitutionally granted Executive powers, constitutional
frameworks also typically provide for various types of parliamentary political control:
from obligations to be duly informed, to approving ex post or ex ante the states of
exception. Another key counterweight is, without a doubt, freedom of expression,
the press, and access to public information, none of which form part of the list of
fundamental rights that can be restricted or suspended during states of exception.
The media and social networks are essential for making visible and denouncing
possible abuses of power, and precisely for that reason some authoritarian rulers,
like Bolsonaro in Brazil, Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela or Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua,
have restricted, or tried to restrict, these freedoms.
Without a doubt, another advancement in Latin America’s judicial landscape (among
other advances in human rights and democratization), is the narrowing of military
jurisdiction to encompass only crimes committed in the course of military work and
only crimes committed by members of the military. This has been one of the most
significant contributions of the Inter-American human rights system to strengthening
the rule of law in Latin America.
Another essential counterbalance to these executive powers is a more recent
democratic achievement in Latin America: judicial controls, (which can now be
exercised in most countries across the region) over the actions of law enforcement
as well as measures adopted by governments that, even in a state of emergency,
may be unconstitutional or  constitute violations of international human rights
standards.
In the case of Peru, the national government has implemented a set of security,
health, economic, and labor measures, among others, to deal with the pandemic. In
this brief note, we will focus on the first group. As is to be expected in a presidential
system of government, the declaration of a “state of emergency” – one of the two
types of “states of exception” provided for in Article 137 of the Constitution – is a
power of the President of the Republic, who is only required to inform Congress.
During a state of emergency, personal freedom, the inviolability of the home,
freedom of assembly, and freedom of movement may be restricted, and the armed
forces may engage in domestic law enforcement activities which, under normal
constitutional conditions, are the responsibility of the National Police. No other civil or
political rights may be suspended.
Within this framework, the government issued Supreme Decree No. 044-2020-PCM
declaring a state of emergency on March 15 and, subsequently, Supreme Decrees
No. 051-2020-PCM and No. 064-2020-PCM, which extended it until and including
April 26; that is, a state of emergency lasting a total of six weeks and it´s possible it
may take a few more weeks. While this constitutionally permissible action confers
special powers on civilian, military, and police authorities, it is not a carte blanche
for potential abuses of power or human rights violations. It is clear from Article 200
of the Constitution, first, that the judicial protection of fundamental rights is not
suspended during states of emergency and, second, that the authorities’ actions
must be governed by the principles of reasonableness and proportionality. The case
law of the judiciary and the Constitutional Court is consistent in this regard.
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However, as of April 7, 52,000 people had been arrested for not complying with the
daytime restrictions on movement – you can only leave your house to buy food,
basic necessities, and medication, or in the case of a medical emergency – or the
nighttime ban on movement during curfew hours (total restriction). Most of these
people are taken to police stations where they are searched and held for a few
hours; those who assault military or police personnel, or are repeat offenders, are
subject to criminal charges. In other words, the failure to comply with compulsory
social distancing – which is the most essential measure to stop the uncontrolled
spread of the pandemic – has been the main reason for these arrests. There have
been no reports of torture, but there have been some isolated cases where police
have subjected transgender people to degrading treatment, which the president has
publicly condemned.
In situations like these, there is always a danger that military or police forces may
abuse their power or violate human rights – an unfortunate reminder of the civilian
and military dictatorships that Peru endured in the past, most recently that of the now
imprisoned ex-President Alberto Fujimori (1992-2000). Nonetheless, they have kept
their actions in line with the constitutional framework thus far, with the exception of a
few reprehensible isolated cases reported by the press and on social media, which
have garnered an almost immediate reaction or response from military and police
chiefs, ministers, and the president. Among other reasons, we believe that this is due
to the democratic nature of the current administration of Martín Vizcarra: there is a
balance of powers with the new legislature now in place, with the judiciary, and with
the other autonomous constitutional bodies such as the Public Prosecutor’s Office.
No political opponents or social leaders are being detained or persecuted.
Another essential feature that makes the current state of emergency compatible with
the democratic framework is the existing freedom of expression and of the press,
which are neither suspended nor restricted. From the first day of the mandatory
quarantine, social media, journalists, and traditional media outlets have been
reporting, monitoring, and sometimes denouncing any indication or situation of
abuse of power or violation of fundamental rights by military or police personnel.
In this context, what has set off alarm bells in national and international human
rights organizations (including the IACHR) about the risks of military or police action
during the current state of emergency has not been – fortunately – any systematic
pattern of violation of fundamental rights as in the past; rather, it was the March 28
publication of Law No. 31012, the Police Protection Law, which unnecessarily and
inappropriately grants certain criminal and procedural privileges to police that are
contrary to the Constitution and international standards and which, if applied, could
provide a cloak of impunity for potential human rights violations against the civilian
population. It also sends a terrible message to the National Police which, despite
much room for improvement, has made efforts in recent years to ensure that its
actions are consistent with a democratic society. In particular, the following areas of
this law are of concern:
• It establishes a kind of “in dubio pro policeman” in wrong application of the
principle of reasonableness: “In exercising their legally established right to self-
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defense and defense of society, the principle of reasonableness of means shall
be interpreted in favor of the police personnel involved” (Article 1, paragraph 2).
• It amends the Code of Criminal Procedure and prohibits judicial orders
restricting the freedom of police officers who have caused death or injury
while using their service weapons, stating that for officers who “…use their
weapons or means of defense as prescribed by law and cause injury or death
[…] warrants for preliminary judicial detention and pretrial detention may not be
issued” (Article 4).
• It creates a special advocate for the legal defense of police officers (Article 15),
when the Office of the Attorney General defends the general interests of the
State rather than those of public servants in particular who, moreover, already
have a legal defense system.
It is therefore clear that in the interpretation of the principle of reasonableness and
in the use – or   not – of precautionary measures restricting freedom, this law seeks
to curtail prosecutorial and judicial action in a manner contrary to the Constitution
and the American Convention on Human Rights. However, it should be noted that
this law was inherited from the previous Congress, which had a pro-Fujimori majority
and was dissolved on September 30, 2019. The previous Congress passed this
legislation, but the President of the Republic disagreed with it and declined to sign
it into law. He also did not state his objections to it (they apparently missed the
deadline for doing so) and, in view of this, Article 108 of the Constitution provides
that the legislature itself should enact and publish the law, which the new Congress
did once installed.
Faced with this controversial law, one legislative caucus has already introduced Bill
No. 4962/2020 to repeal it and another has announced that they will challenge its
constitutionality before the Constitutional Court. It is fair to say that the law does
not reflect the political will of the current administration or of the newly installed
Congress. On the contrary, the Regulations to Legislative Decree No. 1095
governing the use of force by the armed forces, Supreme Decree No. 003-2020-
DE, which was published on 15 March last as part of the government’s package of
measures to deal with the pandemic, clearly establish that military personnel who,
in the performance of their duties, are “charged with a crime or misdemeanor as
defined by ordinary criminal law” will be subject to the jurisdiction of the ordinary
criminal courts rather than the military police courts (Article 42 of the Regulations).
In this regard, the Police Protection Law has sown legitimate fears about the
conduct – which has been appropriate at least up until now, with some reprehensible
exceptions – of the armed forces and the National Police during this health
emergency.
This article in English is an adaptation and update of a previous Spanish version
published by the author on April 6 on the “Justice in the Americas” blog of
the Due Process of Law Foundation (DPLF): http://dplf.org/sites/default/files/
peru_david_lovaton.pdf
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